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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 A jury convicted David Conner of trafficking in five pounds or more of marijuana.  He 
appeals from his judgment of conviction and challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary 
rulings.  Fist, the district court erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence that the 
Oregon State Police stopped Mr. Conner in Ontario, Oregon shortly before the Idaho State Police 
stopped him and discovered marijuana in the trunk of his vehicle.   Second, the district court 
erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence that Mr. Conner was driving 
without privileges in Oregon, got a citation for doing so, and continued on to Idaho.  He asks that 
this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 At around 1:30 p.m. on March 5, 2014, Oregon State Police Officer Mills stopped 
Mr. Conner on I-84 near Ontario for driving 70 miles per hour in a 65 miles per hour zone.1  
(Tr.,2 p.489, L.24–p.491, L.18.)  During the stop, Officer Mills came to believe that Mr. Conner 
may have had drugs in his car because Mr. Conner was driving a rental from California to 
Caldwell during the middle of the week, he only planned to spend a couple of days in Caldwell, 
he had energy drinks in the vehicle, and he did not know where the friend he planned to stay with 
lived.  (Tr., p.498, L.1–p.501, L.6.)  While Officer Mills waited to hear back from dispatch, he 
called for a drug dog.  (Tr., p.501, Ls.3–6.)  None was available.  (Tr., p.501, Ls.7–11.)  
Unbeknownst to Mr. Conner, Officer Mills also called the Idaho State Police to let them know 
                                            
1 At trial, the court admitted a redacted version of the dash camera video of the Oregon stop as 
State’s Exhibit 1. 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the transcript refer to the 961-page transcript titled 
“Conner Final,” which contains all but one of the hearings in this case.   
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that Mr. Conner was driving on a suspended license and that Officer Mills suspected Mr. Conner 
had drugs in the car.  (Tr., p.501, L.7–p.502, L.3.)  After learning that Mr. Conner’s California 
driver’s license was suspended, Officer Mills wrote him a citation and let him go on his way.  
(Tr., p.502, Ls.4–11, p.504, Ls.8–16, p.514, Ls.4–24.)  
 Mr. Conner continued on toward Caldwell, where ISP Officers Tulleners and Cagle were 
waiting for him.3  (Tr., p.547, L.23–p.551, L.8, p.561, L.23–p.569, L.11, p.597, L.8–p.601, 
L.12.)  As soon as the officers pulled Mr. Conner over, Officer Tulleners asked Mr. Conner 
about his suspended license and ran his information through dispatch.  (Tr., p.569, L.12–p.571, 
L.12.)  At about that time, Officer Cullen got to the scene and ran his drug dog along the car.  
(Tr., p.571, Ls.13–23, p.582, L.7–p.584, L.1, p.602, Ls.12–17.)  The dog allegedly alerted near 
the trunk (Tr., p.584, L.2–p.585, L.13), and the officers cuffed Mr. Conner and put him in the 
back of a police car.  (Tr., p.607, Ls.5–10.)  The officers found six bags of what they believed to 
be marijuana in the trunk, and then arrested Mr. Conner.  (Tr., p.585, L.14–p.588, L.17, p.609, 
Ls.1–9; R., pp.17, 24–25.)  The State charged him with trafficking in five pounds or more of 
marijuana, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1), in Canyon County Case No. Cr-2014-5026 (R., pp.24–25), and 
for driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001(3), in Canyon County Case No. Cr-2014-5036 
(R., p.7).  The files were consolidated on March 5, 2014.  (R., pp.26–27.)  
 At the beginning of the first day of trial, while the parties discussed last-minute matters 
with the court, defense counsel said:  
Judge, we just—and we appreciate the advanced notice that the State 
would not be proceeding on the DWP.4  So I’m just trying to save everybody’s 
                                            
3 At trial, the court admitted a redacted version of the dash camera video of the Idaho stop as 
State’s Exhibit 2.  
4 It is unclear when the prosecutor told defense counsel that he did not plan on prosecuting the 
driving without privileges charge, but it appears from the record that it may have happened after 
the status conference the day before trial, or possibly the day of trial. (Compare R., p.196 
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time and the jury’s time.  I don’t see how any of the Oregon stuff is relevant if the 
State isn’t proceeding on the DWP.   And it’s my understanding of the intent to 
call an Oregon officer and play a long video from Oregon.   And I don’t see how 
that’s relevant ‘cause the Court’s already ruled on the 12(b) issues.  So the stuff 
that happened in Oregon is of no consequence. 
 
(Tr., p.192, Ls.9–20 (footnote added).)     
In addition to relevance, defense counsel explained:  
[A]nything about the DWP is not relevant.  And it’s even—it could be even be 
construed as 404(b) evidence. . . .    
And Judge, it’s just not relevant.  Any mention of DWP just, essentially, 
says that this guy’s a criminal.  And if the State wanted to proceed on the DWP, 
they could have, but they chose not to.   
 
(Tr., p.194, L.12–p.195, L.9.) 
 The prosecutor responded:  
Your Honor, there’s certain factual things from the contact by Ryan Mills 
of the Oregon State Police with the defendant, certain things we learned from the 
defendant that the State plans on introducing in this trial.  The State is entitled to 
present the context of its case, including those events which bring about the case, 
basically, that give some meaning and reasoning to what law enforcement is 
doing.  So besides the contextual argument, there’s [sic] also factual issues of 
statements made by the defendant that we plan on bringing in through the video of 
the testimony of Officer Mills.   
And we plan on talking about that the dispatch informed him his license 
was suspended out of California.  That was some of the information passed on to 
Idaho State Police.  This Court ruled in the motion to suppress hearing that 
information is appropriate.  You can rely on dispatch.  Proving DWP in trial’s a 
whole other thing.  Under Idaho law, DWP has certain requirements and 
elements, matters of notice.  We’re not going to get mixed up in that with the jury, 
but they should be allowed, under the law, to hear the basis for what this—you 
know, for the ticket that he received and him being stopped in Idaho, and also to 
hear his statements to the Oregon State Police Officer Ryan Mills.   
Now, you know, I don’t—I wouldn’t like to give away all my argument in 
the case and all my facts, but we find that some of those facts are relevant.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
(January 20 status conference minutes listing both case numbers) and 1/20/15 Tr. with R., p.203 
(January 21 jury trial minutes listing only the trafficking case number) and 1/21/15 Tr.) The 
prosecutor did not actually dismiss the driving without privileges charge until March 16, 2015.  
(R., p.8.) 
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(Tr., p.193, L.4–p.194, L.10.)   
The court decided it would admit evidence of the Oregon stop and Mr. Conner driving 
without privileges:   
With regard to the video, to give the attorneys a heads-up, I have not seen 
the redacted video.  And I have been trying to recall, based upon the motion to 
suppress, my review of the video.  At this point I am inclined to allow the State to 
put on their evidence regarding the Oregon stop, again, with the same concerns 
that I think, at least arguably, the Defense makes some points, which the Court 
should pay attention to, you know, where the State’s dismissing the DWP, how 
relevant is it.  But the Court is aware that there’s other evidence and information 
elicited in the discussion with the defendant during the Oregon stop that may 
relate to the, quote, whole story.  And that’s the basis of the Court’s decision.   
However, the Court will be reviewing rules authority cited by both sides 
and reserves a right to readdress the issue before we start the case after we’ve 
selected a jury. 
 
(Tr., p.205, L.8–p.206, L.2.)   
Later on in the day, defense counsel renewed his objections, arguing that evidence of the 
Oregon stop and evidence that he drove without privileges was not relevant, was highly 
prejudicial under Rule 403, and was impermissible Rule 404(b) character evidence.        
Judge, we would, once again, argue that nothing on the video is 
relevant. . . .  And it is prejudicial.  The defendant was suspended out of 
California.  And when the State was proceeding on the DWP, then it may have 
been relevant.  But they’re no longer proceeding on the DWP . . . .   
And the—and Judge, this is a trafficking charge, not an intent to deliver.  
So the officer’s questions about where he’s going, what street it’s on, how long 
he’s going to be there, none of it’s relevant.  It’s all prejudicial.  And if this was 
intent to deliver, it would be different.  But trafficking is just simple possession of 
X amount of a controlled substance.  And questions about luggage, clothes, where 
he was going, the rental car . . . under the balancing of 403, none of this should 
come in because they’re not proceeding on the DWP.  
 
(Tr., p.364, L.18–p.365, L.23; see also Tr., p.334, Ls.3–4.)   
 When the court asked what the prosecutor thought of Mr. Conner’s Rule 404(b) 
objection, the prosecutor responded:  
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First of all, as argued earlier, it’s contextual.  That’s really part of the reason, the 
basis for the stop in Idaho.  The information’s passed on.  It’s going to be coming 
from Oregon.  The officer sends him on.           
. . . .  
Again, I think it’s—it still comes in as contextual, Your Honor.  We would 
argue that it should be allowed in.  It’s part of the—I don’t know what you will—
the veins of what’s going on here, part of the being of this investigation.   
. . . .  
Some of this stuff, the statements made by the defendant are for the 
substance to address the criminal charge at hand. . . .  [T]he information about 
where he’s going—this is a rental car, [no one asked him to take anything with 
him, and he’s got luggage in the trunk is c]ompletely relevant because it ties him 
. . . as the only person in charge of using this vehicle and to the stuff in that 
vehicle. 
 
(Tr., p.368, L.21–p.371, L.20.)  
 The court again concluded it would admit the evidence:  
In this case, whether or not the defendant . . . was suspended or was charged with 
driving without privileges really was not evidence of propensity to commit a 
trafficking offense, but provides a context to the story of the stop and the 
communication to Idaho law enforcement.  The two attorneys have already 
stipulated the Idaho video into evidence, which includes reference to the fact that 
the defendant was being stopped for driving without privileges based upon the 
information Idaho received. 
 
 (Tr., p.374, L.16–p.375, L.2.)  The court continued:   
This proceeding involves a sort of continuing course of activity that involved the 
State of Oregon, law enforcement in Oregon making a legitimate stop on a 
defendant, citing him for not having a valid driver’s license in Oregon and 
reporting that to law enforcement in Idaho who, using that evidence, makes a 
stop.  And I’ve already made a ruling on that.   
And so it provides context to the story.  Given the fact that the Court has 
already ruled that there was probable cause for the stop on both ends, the—and 
that the Idaho video recites the information that they—the Idaho officers had from 
Oregon, including that the defendant was suspended, I don’t find that—I find that 
it’s relevant to the extent it provides context and explanation for the stops, the 
story.  It’s—any prejudice does not outweigh any probative value. . . .   
. . . .  
If the defendant—if the evidence was that the defendant was charged with 
trafficking in Malheur County the week before, that would be a propensity 404(b), 
prior bad act.  The fact that he got stopped for DWP, was told he was suspended 
and then subsequently stopped and cited in Idaho, to me, is not propensity 
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evidence in the trafficking.  And it provides context to the entire story of this 
prosecution and this charge. . . .  
 
(Tr., p.377, L.6–p.378, L.23.) 
The version of the Oregon video introduced at trial is about half of the length of the 
original 23-minute video.  (Compare State’s Ex. 1 to 1/22/15 jury trial with State’s Ex. 1 to 
Motion Hearing to Amend Information.5)  It shows Officer Mills stopping Mr. Conner’s car, 
asking for his license and registration, and then asking Mr. Conner questions about his trip.  
(1/22/15 State’s Ex. 1, at 1:45–5:30.)  During the conversation, Mr. Conner said that he was 
driving a rental car from the Redding area in California to visit a friend in Caldwell where he 
would stay for a few days.  (Id. at 2:40–5:30.)  When asked where he was staying in Caldwell, 
Mr. Conner said he would stay at his friend’s house, but he did not remember the address and 
could not describe where it was.  (Id. at 5:15–6:00.)   
Officer Mills took Mr. Conner’s information back to his patrol car to send it to dispatch, 
then asked to talk to Mr. Conner outside of his car.  (Id. at 7:30–8:30.)  Officer Mills asked if 
there were any drugs or large amounts of cash in the car, or if anyone had asked him to take 
anything to Caldwell for them, which Mr. Conner denied.  (Id. at 8:25–9:15.)  Mr. Conner said 
he did have luggage in the trunk of the car.  (Id. at 8:30–8:40.)  Officer Mills said “you’re just 
making a one-day trip to your friend’s house,” to which Mr. Conner responded that he was going 
for a few days and explained his travel plans.  (Id. at 8:40–8:48.)  Officer Mills then said he’d be 
calling a drug dog, and asked Mr. Conner if the dog would alert on his car.  (Id. at 9:00–9:25.)  
Mr. Conner said he would not.  (Id. at 9:15–30.)  The video then jumped ahead to Officer Mills 
                                            
5 It appears this exhibit has been mislabeled.  The State did not introduce an exhibit at the 
hearing on the motion to amend the information (see 1/20/15 Tr.), but did introduce a video of 
the Oregon stop at the hearing on the motion to suppress (Tr., p.15, Ls.10–11, p.87, L.24–p.88, 
L.15).  
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telling Mr. Conner that he could not get a drug dog, citing Mr. Conner for driving on a 
suspended license out of California, and then returning to his patrol car.  (Id. 10:00–10:56.)   
Officer Miller testified consistently with the video of the Oregon stop, and also told the 
jury why he suspected Mr. Conner was involved in criminal activity:  
My suspicion was based on several initial things at the initial contact . . .  
One, it was a rental vehicle.  I’ve rented vehicles myself.  But I do know from 
training and experience that rental vehicles are often used to commit criminal 
activity because it separates that person from their car, as far as not being the 
ownership [sic] of the car.   
I noticed it was in the middle of the week that he rented.  It was a very, 
very short trip.  Those are very common when it—it’s particular to the 
transportation of drugs because people rent a car just for enough time to get where 
they’re needed to go and get right back home.  And in this case, when I looked at 
the rental paperwork, Mr. Conner rented the vehicle the 4th.  I had stopped him 
the 5th.  And it was due back, I believe, at noon on the 8th in Anderson, 
California.   
I asked him where he was going.  He told me Caldwell.  So that means he 
was only going to rent a vehicle and stay in Caldwell at that time for a day and a 
half, maybe, in the middle of a work week.  So take almost 40 hours of work off 
to stay a day and a half in Caldwell.  I asked him what he was doing.  He told me 
he was visiting a friend.  And told me—that used to live in Anderson.  So I said, 
“Well, where does your friend live?”  He kind of hesitated.  He asked me a couple 
of repetitive questions back, which is, from my training and experience, someone 
trying to come up with an answer. . . .   
. . . .  
. . . I asked him where he was headed to visit his friend.  And the best answer he 
could give me was something boulevard.  I also know from my training and 
experience that oftentimes people that are involved in criminal activity, 
specifically transportation of drugs, don’t always know exactly where they’re 
headed.  And they contact the person once they get to their destination, and that's 
when they’re given an address.   
So based on those—and the other thing that I noticed was a—a crushed 
energy drink on the floorboard.  The only thing that was visible in the car was a 
cooler.  I asked him if he had any alcohol in the car.  He opened it up, showed it 
to me.  And there was additional energy drinks in there, along with water.  That’s 
also something I’m looking for.  When someone’s heading to a location, they 
commonly have energy drinks in the car because they want to get to that 
destination as quickly as possible, and they want to stay alert.    
So the combination of all those things made me think that potentially the 
driver was involved in criminal activity and that’s why I asked for a drug K9 to 
further my investigation. 
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(Tr., p.498, L.1–p.501, L.6.)   
The jury found Mr. Conner guilty of trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana.  
(Tr., p.926, L.7–p.927, L.22; R., p.309.)  The court sentenced him to seven years, with three 
years fixed (R., pp.325–26), and Mr. Conner timely appealed (R., pp.327–28).   
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ISSUES 
I. Did the district court err by admitting evidence of the Oregon stop because it is irrelevant 
and unfairly prejudicial, and can the State show that error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt?   
 
II.  Did the district court err by admitting evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges 
because it is irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence, and can the State show that 




This Court applies a mixed standard of review to questions of admissibility.  State v. 
Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015).  It reviews whether evidence is relevant de novo, while it 
reviews whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse 
of discretion.  Id.  The abuse of discretion standard considers:  “(1) whether the court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries 
of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  Id.  If an error is followed by a contemporaneous 
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of 
proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.’”  Id. at 911 (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 




Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Is Irrelevant And Unfairly Prejudicial, And The State Cannot 
Show That The District Court’s Erroneous Admission Of That Evidence Is Harmless 
  
Over defense counsel’s objection on the grounds of relevance and prejudice, the district 
court erroneously admitted evidence of the Oregon stop.  Because the State cannot show that the 
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to that error, the error 
requires remand. 
     
A. The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Because It Is 
Irrelevant And Unfairly Prejudicial 
 
“Relevant Evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
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it would be without the evidence.  I.R.E. 401.  Only relevant evidence is admissible.  I.R.E. 402.  
In addition, even relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  I.R.E. 403.  “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial 
simply because it is damaging to a defendant’s case.  Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it 
suggests decision on an improper basis.”  State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2011). 
The district court erroneously admitted evidence of the Oregon stop.  First, evidence of 
the Oregon stop—including the Oregon video and Officer Mills’ testimony6—was not relevant to 
any fact of consequence in this case.  The State charged Mr. Conner with trafficking more than 
five pounds of marijuana (R., pp.201–02), which required the State to prove that: 
1. On or about March 5, 2014; 
2. In the state of Idaho; 
3 Mr. Conner possessed and/or brought into the state marijuana; 
4. He knew it was marijuana; and 
5. He possessed five pounds or more of marijuana. 
 
(See R., p.294.)  The video of the Oregon stop and Officer Mills’ testimony have no bearing on 
the elements of the crime charged.  As explained by defense counsel, “this is a trafficking 
charge, not an intent to deliver.  So the officer’s questions about where he’s going, what street 
it’s on, how long he’s going to be there, none of it’s relevant.”  (Tr., p.365, Ls.11–15.)  The 
district court’s own reasoning supports this conclusion.  It did not conclude that the evidence was 
relevant to prove the crime charged, but rather allowed the evidence in as background 
information.  (Tr., p.205, Ls.19–22 (explaining that “there’s other evidence and information 
elicited in the discussion with the defendant during the Oregon stop that may relate to the, quote, 
whole story”), p.377, Ls.6–14 (“This proceeding involves a sort of continuing course of activity 
                                            
6 Although evidence that Mr. Conner was driving without privileges came about during the 
Oregon stop, Mr. Conner challenges that evidence separately.   
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that involved the State of Oregon, law enforcement in Oregon making a legitimate stop on a 
defendant, citing him for not having a valid driver’s license in Oregon and reporting that to law 
enforcement in Idaho who, using that evidence, makes a stop. . . .  And so it provides context to 
the story.”).)  Because the evidence does not tend to prove or disprove any fact of consequence, 
it is not relevant and thus inadmissible under Rules 401 and 402.   
Second, evidence of the Oregon stop unfairly prejudiced Mr. Conner because it made him 
out to be a dishonest and suspicious person who does not respect the law.  The video showed 
Officer Mills pulling Mr. Conner over for speeding and asking him various questions about what 
he was doing, where he was going, and whether he was involved in anything illegal.  
(See generally 1/22/15 State’s Ex. 1.)  In response to those questions, Mr. Conner said that he 
had no drugs in the car and that a drug dog would not alert on the car.  (See generally id.)  In 
addition, Officer Mills testified that he suspected Mr. Conner was involved in criminal activity 
because he was going on a short trip, drove a rental car, had energy drinks, and did not know the 
address where he was going to stay that night.  (Tr., p.498, L.1–p.501, L.6.)  This evidence 
tended to show that Mr. Conner is a dishonest and suspicious person who disrespects the law, 
and thus suggests a decision on an improper basis. See Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870.  Because the 
Oregon stop is not relevant to the trafficking charge and unfairly prejudiced Mr. Conner, the 
district court erred by admitting that evidence. 
   
B. The State Cannot Show That Mr. Conner’s Guilty Verdict Was Surely Unattributable To 
Evidence Of The Oregon Stop 
 
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears 
the burden of proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.’”   Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 
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24).  Under Chapman, an error is harmless if the government can prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.  Id.  “[T]he issue under Chapman is 
whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt, independently of” the inadmissible evidence.  Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 
404 (1991).  “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the 
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).   
Here, the State cannot show that Mr. Conner’s guilty verdict was surely unattributable to 
evidence of the Oregon stop.  See id.  Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Conner’s judgment 
of conviction and remand to the district court. 
      
II. 
Evidence That Mr. Conner Was Driving Without Privileges Is Irrelevant And Prejudicial 
Character Evidence, And The State Cannot Show That District Court’s Erroneous Admission Of 
That Evidence Is Harmless 
 
The district court erroneously admitted evidence that Mr. Conner drove on a suspended 
license over defense counsel’s objection that such evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial character 
evidence.  Because the State cannot show that the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial 
was surely unattributable to that error, the error requires remand. 
     
A. The Court Erred By Admitting Evidence That Mr. Conner Was Driving Without 
Privileges Because It Is Irrelevant And Prejudicial Character Evidence 
 
 Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”  
“It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
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preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  I.R.E. 404(b).  
Therefore, “‘evidence of a person’s actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate 
issue for trial, is generally inadmissible.’”  State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 119 (Ct. App. 
1992) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990)) (emphasis added).  
Under Rule 403, even relevant evidence may be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs its probative value.    
To decide whether the district court properly admitted Rule 404(b) evidence, this Court 
first determines if there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact.7  
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).  Next, it asks whether, under Rule 404(b), the evidence is 
relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant’s character or criminal 
propensity.  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010).  Finally, it asks whether, under Rule 
403, the district court abused its discretion by finding that the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.  Id. at 667.   
In this case, the court abused its discretion by initially deciding to admit the evidence 
without addressing the Rule 404(b) argument at all.  When deciding whether to admit the 
evidence on the morning of the first day of trial, the court simply stated:   
At this point I am inclined to allow the State to put on their evidence 
regarding the Oregon stop, again, with the same concerns that I think, at least 
arguably, the Defense makes some points, which the Court should pay attention 
to, you know, where the State’s dismissing the DWP, how relevant is it.  But the 
Court is aware that there’s other evidence and information elicited in the 
discussion with the defendant during the Oregon stop that may relate to the, 
quote, whole story.  And that’s the basis of the Court’s decision.   
However, the Court will be reviewing rules and authority cited by both 
sides and reserves a right to readdress the issue before we start the case after 
we’ve selected a jury. 
 
                                            
7 Mr. Conner does not contend that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he was driving 
without privileges.   
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(Tr., p.205, L.12–p.206, L.2.)  Because the court did not conduct the requisite analysis—deciding 
whether the evidence was relevant to an issue other than Mr. Conner’s character and then 
whether the prejudice caused by that evidence outweighed its probative value—it abused its 
discretion.  See State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 139 (2014) (“By failing to conduct the Rule 403 
balancing test, the district court did not act consistently within the applicable legal standards,” 
and thus abused its discretion). 
When addressing defense counsel’s renewed objections later in the day, the court 
mistakenly concluded that this evidence was not character evidence in the first place because it 
was not the same type of conduct as the charged conduct.  (Tr., p.374, Ls.17–20 (“whether or not 
the defendant . . . was suspended or was charged with driving without privileges really was not 
evidence of propensity to commit a trafficking offense.”), p.376, Ls.15–22 (“if the evidence was 
that the defendant was charged with trafficking in Malheur County the week before, that would 
be a propensity 404(b), prior bad act.  The fact that he got stopped for DWP, was told he was 
suspended and then subsequently stopped and cited in Idaho, to me, is not propensity evidence in 
the trafficking.”)8.)  To the contrary, the plain language of Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”  Rule 404(b) does not require that the prior 
act and alleged crime be identical or even similar.  Rather, the rule applies to any evidence that 
tends to prove the defendant’s bad character.  See id.  That Mr. Conner was driving on a 
suspended license in Oregon, was cited for doing so, and then continued driving on to Idaho, 
                                            
8 The court also noted that “[t]he two attorneys have already stipulated the Idaho video into 
evidence, which includes reference to the fact that the defendant was being stopped for driving 
without privileges based upon the information Idaho received.” (Tr., p.374, L.22–p.375, L.2.)  
That’s true.  (See Tr., p.351, L.25–p.355, L.4.)  But that stipulation only came after the court said 
it would admit the evidence (Tr., p.205, L.8–p.206, L.2), and thus has no bearing on this issue.  
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does just that.  It shows Mr. Conner does not believe the rules apply to him and has no respect 
for law enforcement.  Therefore, evidence that Mr. Conner was driving without privileges is 
character evidence according to the plain definition in Rule 404(b).   
Next, evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges is not relevant to any issue other 
than Mr. Conner’s character.  The evidence, by the State and the Court’s own acknowledgement, 
only provided context to the stop.  (Tr., p.194, Ls.2–6 (the State explaining that the jury “should 
be allowed, under the law, to hear the basis for what this—you know, for the ticket that he 
received and him being stopped in Idaho, and also to hear his statements to the Oregon State 
Police Officer Ryan Mills.”), p.368, Ls.21–24 (the State reiterating that, “as argued earlier, it’s 
contextual.  That’s really part of the reason, the basis for the stop in Idaho.”), p.205, Ls.21–22 
(the court acknowledging that it goes to the “whole story”).)  Why Mr. Conner was stopped in 
Idaho, and much less that he was stopped at all in Oregon, has no bearing on whether he was 
trafficking marijuana and is therefore not relevant to an ultimate issue for trial.   
Finally, the prejudice to Mr. Conner substantially outweighed the negligible probative 
value of the evidence.  As discussed above, evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges in 
Oregon, got a ticket, and continued driving on to Idaho shows that Mr. Conner does not believe 
the rules apply to him and has no respect for law enforcement.  This prejudice substantially 
outweighs the “probative” value of the evidence, which was only to provide the jury with 
background information that is wholly irrelevant to the ultimate issues for trial.  Therefore, the 
court erred by admitting evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges. 
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B. The State Cannot Show That Mr. Conner’s Guilty Verdict Was Surely Unattributable To 
The Evidence That Mr. Conner Drove Without Privileges 
 
As discussed above (see supra, pp.12–13), when a defendant objects to a trial error and 
shows on appeal that a violation occurred, the State has the burden of proving “‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’”  
Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).  The State cannot show that 
Mr. Conner’s guilty verdict was surely unattributable to the evidence that he drove without 
privileges.  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279. 
       
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Conner respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
remand to the district court for a new trial. 
 DATED this 24th day of March, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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